Amid stalled talks on finance, adaptation and fossil fuel transition at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil’s Amazon region, governments agreed to an ambitious Just Transition package combining the strongest rights- and inclusion-based language yet seen in the UN climate process with a new global mechanism to support countries reshaping their economies.
The COP30 decision also confirmed that Just Transition must take a whole-of-society and whole-of-economy approach – covering mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and finance – a broad scope that observers said marked a significant step forward for the process.
Delegates described the outcome in the city of Belém as a rare convergence of political will, technical facilitation and years of groundwork by civil society and governments.
For Indian women workers, a just transition means surviving climate impacts with dignity
The decision also places stronger emphasis on the social and economic foundations of transition than many observers had expected. The text links Just Transition explicitly to poverty eradication and decent work, and recognises the need for just energy transitions as part of implementing the Global Stocktake – including the transition away from fossil fuels.
Finance provisions were also firmer than in previous drafts, with governments agreeing that support for Just Transition should prioritise grants and non-debt-creating instruments, a framing long pushed by developing countries and civil society.
Civil society kept the issue alive
The Work Programme on Just Transition, launched in 2022, remained low-profile across several COP cycles. Unions, youth networks, feminist groups, social movements and environmental organisations continued refining proposals and pushing negotiators even when political attention was limited – while activists also took to the streets across the world calling for a Just Transition.
As momentum built toward COP30, these groups began referring to their proposal as the Belém Action Mechanism – the “BAM” – signalling the level of institutional ambition they believed the process required. Alongside this sustained organising, unions stressed that Just Transition had to move beyond principles and into practice.
Key governments shifted earlier than expected
As colourful activists danced and chanted “We want the BAM!” in the COP30 conference centre, a key moment arrived on day two, when the G77+China group of developing countries came out early and clearly signalled its support for establishing a Just Transition mechanism. This leadership was widely described as the turning point that made an ambitious outcome possible.
The EU followed at the end of the first week, tabling a “bridging proposal” in the form of a Just Transition Action Plan. From that point, civil society campaigns intensified across the Global North, aimed at shifting governments that had so far resisted any new institutional arrangements.
COP30: Spain’s unions say just transition means renewing communities beyond jobs
The UK – initially identified by observers as the main hold-out – faced sustained campaigning, including an NGO sign-on letter and direct engagement with ministers. The political shift became visible inside the talks when Ed Miliband signalled support for the EU plan during the High-Level Ministerial Roundtable.
That shift extended beyond the UK. Canada, previously quiet on new institutional arrangements, began describing itself as “open to options” after targeted domestic media coverage. Australian civil society leveraged the country’s COP31 bid to draw attention to the need for coordination institutions, while NGOs in Belém maintained pressure on Swiss negotiators.
The push for the mechanism reached the highest level of the UN system. After a meeting with civil society, UN Secretary-General António Guterres added his voice of support for the mechanism and urged COP30 to operationalise a Just Transition aligned with 1.5°C.
Facilitators and ministers closed the gaps
Last year at COP29 in Baku, the Just Transition track ended without an outcome partly because no ministers were mandated to land one. Belém took a different approach: Mexico’s Alicia Bárcena and Poland’s Krzysztof Bolesta were appointed as ministerial leads and played a central role in balancing strong rights language with the institutional detail.
Technical co-facilitators Joseph Teo of Singapore and Federica Fricano of Italy were credited with producing a clear, workable draft that helped bridge divides. Delegates said its readability – unusual for UNFCCC text – helped maintain trust. UNFCCC secretariat staff supported the process with rapid revision work through the second week.
Brazil’s presidency and the significance of place
Brazil made Just Transition one of its three priorities, ensuring the track remained visible amid wider disputes.
The signal came early: at Climate Action Network’s Annual Strategy Meeting in Rio de Janeiro in February, attended by more than 170 climate justice activists, COP30 President Ambassador André Correa do Lago and COP30 CEO Ana Toni told participants that Just Transition would be a “vital” issue for COP30. The presidency also guided parties toward addressing the issue of “institutional arrangements” during the Pre-COP.
“Water is worth more than lithium,” Indigenous Argentine community tells COP30
Belém’s context also mattered. The region is a long-standing focal point for debates over livelihoods, extractivism and environmental protection, grounding negotiations in lived realities.
A symbol of this was the People’s March on the streets of Belém, with over 50,000 people participating, and thousands more across the world. The message of the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon was clear: a Just Transition cannot be designed about them or around them – it must be shaped with them, and how transition minerals are managed is central to this.
What the decision changes
The final text sets out principles for rights-based, inclusive transitions and establishes a global mechanism to support countries in implementing these principles – elevating the mechanism to a structural component of how climate action will be delivered in the Paris Agreement era.
The agreement also reinforces the expectation that social and economic dimensions must be central to national climate plans, not appended to them.
A just transition for renewables: Why COP30 must put people before power
The work starts now
Civil society will remain closely engaged as the mechanism takes shape, arguing that its effectiveness will depend on whether it reflects the realities facing workers, communities and families in transitions already underway.
The next phase will hinge on the operational details governments agree in the months ahead. Key questions include the design of the committee, what form secretariat support will take, and whether civil society and trade unions will have a formal seat in its work.
Parties will also need to decide whether the mechanism should help convene a wider network of practitioners. Its first workplan, the identification of support needs, and clarification of how it will interact with existing UNFCCC bodies, will shape how effective it becomes – with decisions expected at COP31.
The post How Belém launched the Just Transition mechanism appeared first on Climate Home News.
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/12/10/how-belem-built-a-new-just-transition-mechanism/
For the first time, new-energy vehicles (NEVs) made up 67% of new car sales in China in September, according to the latest data from the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA).
The figures show that NEVs, which include battery electric cars and plug-in hybrids, captured a record share of sales, even though fewer were sold than last year.
This is because sales of combustion-engine cars are falling steeply, a trend that the CPCA has attributed to rising petrol prices following the start of the Hormuz crisis.
Indeed, sales of fuel-only cars were down 31% year-on-year in the first nine months of 2026, with plug-in hybrid sales down 26% – whereas battery EV sales were only down 4%.
One analyst tells Carbon Brief that China’s rapidly growing EV fleet has offset demand for 143m barrels of oil since the start of the Hormuz crisis.
Another says that the crisis is “reinforcing China’s electrification of road transport”.
Meanwhile, amid slowing domestic sales, Chinese carmakers’ exports of NEVs more than doubled [in 2026 to date / in September] from a year earlier.
NEV record
A record two out of every three cars sold in September in China were NEVs, according to CPCA data, as shown in the figure below.
(NEVs predominantly include battery electric vehicles – BEVs – and plug-in hybrids – PHEVs. BEVs only run on electricity, whereas PHEVs also have a combustion engine.)
This marks a rapid rise for NEVs from just 6% of new car sales in 2020 up to 58% in 2026 to date – and a record 67% in the month of September.
This year, NEVs’ share of sales has also bounced back from a low of 39% in January, after the full purchase tax exemption that had been in place for more than a decade came to an end in December 2025.
The gain in NEV share in 2026 has come amid a slowdown across the wider domestic passenger-car market, which has hit sales of combustion-engine vehicles particularly hard.
This September, passenger-car retail sales across all categories declined, with overall sales volumes falling 28% year-on-year.
The contraction was led by combustion-engine vehicles, which saw sales fall 43% year-on-year in September and 31% in 2026 to date.
However, sales of PHEVs also fell by 36% year-on-year in September and by 26% in 2026 to date. By comparison, BEVs performed better, although sales still declined 8.5% from a year earlier in September and 4% in 2026 to date.
As a result, NEV sales overall fell by 17% in September and 13% in 2026 to date.
While the market changes in 2026 to date were particularly dramatic, they reflect a broad continuation of trends seen over the past decade.
Indeed, sales of combustion-engine cars in China peaked in 2017 and they have been declining ever since, shown in the figure below.
Impact of Hormuz
Part of the reason for the advance of NEVs in 2026, said Chinese technology news outlet OFweek, was petrol cars “giving up market share” as they were outperformed by electric alternatives.
Cui Dongshu, secretary-general of the CPCA, cited higher petrol prices as an explanation for September’s weak combustion-car sales, in comments to financial news outlet National Business Daily.
Imports of oil into China in January-September have fallen 15% compared to 2025, equivalent to 470m barrels, as ongoing conflict tightened supply and drove up prices.
China’s passenger-car NEV fleet has displaced 143m barrels of oil so far during the strait of Hormuz crisis, Euan Graham, senior energy analyst at thinktank Ember, tells Carbon Brief.
EVs “accounted for 12% of the decrease in China’s oil use post-Hormuz”, according to an estimate provided to thinktank the Brookings Institute by an unnamed analyst.
Erica Downs, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, tells Carbon Brief that the strait of Hormuz crisis and higher oil prices are “reinforcing China’s electrification of road transport”.
She says the “world’s largest oil supply disruption” vindicates China’s early bet on EVs, which was partly driven by concerns about oil-supply security.
NEV demand down
Nevertheless, NEV sales have fallen year-on-year, albeit at a slower rate than overall car sales. The growth in NEV market share has also been decelerating.
Zhang Yichao, a partner at consulting firm AlixPartners, tells Carbon Brief that NEVs benefit from government trade-in policies and a “strong pipeline” of new models, particularly those involving innovation.
He says these factors help explain why NEVs sales have fallen at a slower rate to their combustion-car counterparts.
Cui told the state-run China National Radio that the fall for NEVs and for cars overall in September 2026, is also due to a high baseline of sales from the same month in 2025, as well as changes to trade-in policies and disruptions from the holiday period.
Other factors, says consulting firm Wood Mackenzie, are the weakened demand due to “demand pull-forward” in 2025 caused by the end of subsidies, as well as “tighter financing conditions”.
Zhang tells Carbon Brief he does not “see much more room ahead” for further growth in NEVs’ market share.
He adds that, in his view, their share in China is unlikely to exceed 80%, as some premium-market segments and specific use cases will continue to require combustion-engine vehicles.
Exports surge
Meanwhile, while domestic NEV retail sales fell 17% in September 2026, exports more than doubled, increasing 164% year-on-year, according to the CPCA.
This extends the decline in domestic sales and very strong growth in exports seen across 2026 to date, as shown in the figure below.