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With UN climate negotiations underway at COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), climate finance has once again been one of the key issues countries have been clashing over.

The recently concluded process to design the new “loss-and-damage fund” highlighted known rifts between developed and developing country parties on finance provision.

One such rift is the lingering question of who should provide climate finance to help developing countries decarbonise their economies and protect themselves from climate hazards.

Traditionally, only a small set of high-income nations have been obliged to provide this finance under the UN system.

Some parties, including the US and the EU, have argued that this list should expand to include relatively wealthy emerging economies, such as China and the Gulf states.

As our analysis demonstrates, many of these nations already provide substantial sums of money that could potentially be described as “climate finance”.

In fact, large nations, such as India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia contribute to more climate-related finance via multilateral development banks (MDBs) than many countries in the global north.

Meanwhile, China could rival the largest developed-country donors even on direct climate funding for developing countries.

Different responsibilities

Current responsibility for climate finance under the UN climate regime lies with Annex II countries – meaning the high-income nations that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) when the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992.

These nations – including western Europe, the EU, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan – bear the obligation to provide a minimum of $100bn in climate finance annually to developing countries by 2020 – and up to 2025. (Developed countries failed to reach the 2020 target.)

Developing countries do not have such a responsibility, but they are “encouraged” to contribute voluntary climate finance under the Paris Agreement. This voluntary contribution aims to reflect the collective global effort required to combat climate change.

Yet, the heart of the ongoing political disputes lies in the nebulous categorisation of “developed” and “developing” introduced in the Paris Agreement in 2015.

This arrangement was viewed as a necessary compromise to replace the rigid and outdated lists agreed in 1992, which entrusted such financially divergent nations as Qatar and Malawi with the same climate responsibilities.

In theory, it opened the door for countries to self-differentiate their responsibilities and capabilities to reflect their evolving economic weight and influence in the world. To date, no developing country has made use of this possibility and formally pledged to provide climate finance.

As countries negotiate a new climate finance target for 2025 onwards to succeed the £100bn goal, developed countries would like to see the list of contributor countries formally expanded. There has been a similar effort to make countries such as China and Saudi Arabia contribute to the new loss-and-damage fund.

Top donors

Ongoing disputes about expanding the “donor base” for climate finance within the UNFCCC have overlooked the voluntary finance support that developing countries are already providing to other developing countries, in the spirit of solidarity. 

Analyses from ODI and E3G have shed light on the magnitude of these contributions. 

ODI’s research reveals that virtually all developing country parties are already providing “climate finance” through their contributions to multilateral institutions.

Large, middle-income countries, which are often called upon to assume climate-finance obligations, are already contributing “climate finance” for other developing countries through multilateral development banks (MDBs), such as the World Bank, and climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund. 

Accounting for these financial flows would place BRICS heavyweights  – China, India, Brazil and Russia – among the top 20 providers globally. 

Saudi Arabia, which alongside other relatively wealthy emerging economies has resisted efforts to broaden the climate finance donor pool, would also make the top 20. This can be seen in the chart below.

Top 25 largest climate-related finance providers, including developed (grey) and developing (red) countries, via MDBs and multilateral climate funds, 2020. Lighter shades indicate MDB finance and darker shades indicate funds. Country groupings are based on UNFCCC classification. Source: ODI. Chart by Carbon Brief.
Top 25 largest climate-related finance providers, including developed (grey) and developing (red) countries, via MDBs and multilateral climate funds, 2020. Lighter shades indicate MDB finance and darker shades indicate funds. Country groupings are based on UNFCCC classification. Source: ODI. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The bulk of these contributions are via MDBs. Countries pay into these banks for a range of reasons and their primary intention may not always be to provide climate finance to other developing countries.

However, they are still relevant, especially given that developed countries such as the US rely heavily on such MDB contributions when reporting their own climate finance.

Additionally, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Korea have also made specific contributions to multilateral climate funds, which are clearly intended to be used for climate action by developing countries.

Bilateral flows

Crucially, these multilateral figures are likely to be a significant underestimate of the total climate-related finance provided by developing countries.

This is because they do not account for bilateral – or country-to-country – finance flows to other developing countries, such as those distributed via China’s South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund or the Belt and Road Initiative.

There is a lack of official data on these flows, but our analysis shows that they can be significant.

For example, E3G analysis of Chinese bilateral finance data compiled by research institute AidData shows that China has invested, on average, $1.46bn per year worth of climate-related projects between 2012 and 2017. (Data could not be assembled for the years after 2017.)

International climate-related bilateral funding from China to developing countries, 2012-2017. Source: E3G. Chart by Carbon Brief.
International climate-related bilateral funding from China to developing countries, 2012-2017. Source: E3G. Chart by Carbon Brief.

This includes both public and private bilateral investments, as well as aid in the energy, transport, water and disaster risk reduction sectors that could be described as either reducing emissions or improving climate resilience.

If the public portions of these bilateral financial flows are combined with multilateral flows, China would rank as the seventh largest provider of international climate finance to developing countries in 2017.

The nation’s $2.1bn of contributions place it roughly on a par with Italy and ahead of many developed countries including Canada and Norway in that year.

Reporting challenges

Despite these substantial contributions, the financial support provided by China and other large, middle-income nations to their fellow developing countries are going largely unrecognised by the international system.

One key reason is that developing countries are not obliged to report such contributions.

A fundamental reason for this is that these countries fear potential misinterpretation. Reporting such support voluntarily might lead to geopolitical expectations and pressure to assume “developed country” responsibilities, including taking more drastic actions to reduce emissions, our research suggests. 

A change in status in the climate regime could also result in pressure on similar changes in other international regimes such as development finance or trade.

The under-delivery of the $100bn climate finance goal by developed countries also dissuades interested and capable developing countries from enhancing their voluntary support.

Although the $100bn goal is likely to have been met in 2023, it is hard for developing countries to rally the political support to send taxpayers’ money abroad, when rich countries are seen as not paying their “fair share”.

In addition, developing countries often lack the institutional and technical capacity to fully disclose their voluntary financial contributions.

The lack of transparency also extends to underreported commitments by other non-state actors, including corporations and financial institutions. These issues could be addressed collectively in ongoing discussions in the UNFCCC secretariat-led accountability framework for non-state actors.

New goal

Delegates at UN climate negotiations are set to agree on a new international climate finance goal, succeeding the $100bn, by COP29 in 2024. This target will include details on the sources of finance and likely reshape the climate finance landscape for the next decade.

COP28 could build the groundwork for a consensus on the so-called “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG), including an acknowledgement of existing contributions from developing countries.

The NCQG could do this while providing reassurance that the obligations of developed countries in leading the global climate-finance effort will continue, emphasising that voluntary contributions by developing countries will not be conflated with the politics of country categorisation.

It could even enhance voluntary contributions from non-developed country parties by considering the creation of some kind of “sub-goal” for them, while making it clear this would be on the basis of solidarity and not an obligation.

Such language could serve as a political reset, helping to rebuild trust in the international climate finance system. 

The post Guest post: Why some ‘developing’ countries are already among largest climate-finance contributors appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Guest post: Why some ‘developing’ countries are already among largest climate-finance contributors

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Climate Change

Minerals for the planet or for war and AI? COP31 must make clear what we prioritise

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Elisa Morgera is the UN Special Rapporteur on Climate Change and Human Rights.

For years, governments and international financial institutions have justified the mining boom by arguing that the energy transition cannot happen without critical minerals.

Increasingly, however, they are securing those minerals for something else: weapons and artificial intelligence (AI).

At COP31, governments must make clear what a sustainable and fair energy transition requires and reject demand for minerals that fuels war and other climate-harming uses. 

Independent research shows that mineral demand is increasingly driven by AI and militarisation. Yet, both undermine climate action.

Major armed conflicts are linked to fossil fuel expansion, generate emissions that are unaccounted for under the Paris Agreement, and deliver record profits to fossil fuel and petrochemical companies through price spikes and disrupted access to fuel and food.

Meanwhile, AI infrastructure risks undoing the progress of the renewable energy transition by driving fossil fuel expansion to meet data centres’ vast new energy demand.

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the head of UN Climate Change Simon Stiell have both warned of the climate harm of unchecked, fossil fuel-powered AI and data centre growth.

    In addition, AI equipment and infrastructure require huge amounts of copper – one of the minerals most in demand for the energy transition. A recent academic study found that copper makes up roughly 82-83% of the mineral mass in data centres.

    None of this demand serves the energy transition. Instead, the climate case for mining is being used to legitimise uses that undermine a sustainable future.

    Mining still relies heavily on fossil fuels and often harms the environment, so it must be limited to extracting the resources strictly necessary for the energy transition. Otherwise, states breach their binding obligations to protect the environment and human rights, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made clear. 

    National security is the new mining fast track

    Campaigners have long warned that when minerals become a matter of national security, governments are more tempted to deregulate and fast-track mining projects. Communities pay the price.

    Extraction without adequate consultation is a global pattern linked to killings of land and environmental defenders. More than half of transition mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous lands, and allegations of abuses linked to mining transition minerals surged 73% in 2025 alone.

    Security and climate are not separate problems. Both are rooted in the fossil fuel-based global economy, now joined by the unchecked growth of AI and data centres.

    Who should benefit from minerals?

    Not every demand for minerals can or should be met. Minerals are finite and must be used to address the worsening climate crisis as a priority.

    The COP31 presidency’s push for electrification will have significant implications for mineral demand. At the same time, electrification doesn’t necessarily help to phase out fossil fuels. Governments must be clear about how minerals are being used and prioritise uses that genuinely advance the energy transition.

    • Climate action comes first: Mineral demand for the wind and solar projects that power communities and essential public services such as local food systems should be met first. Priority uses should include community-led wind and solar projects and renewable power for public transport.
    • No support for climate-harming activities: Mineral demand projections for the energy transition should exclude the military-industrial complex and data centres, and governments should reconsider public spending on militarisation. Mineral demand for electrification should also be scrutinised to avoid deepening fossil fuel dependence.
    • Cut demand before expanding supply: High-consuming countries should use less primary material through efficiency, longer-lasting products and by reducing car dependence, rather than exporting waste and harm to the Global South.
    • Prioritise energy needs: Those without access to energy must be served first. Overproduction and overconsumption must be curbed, otherwise the transition will neither mitigate climate change nor reduce poverty.
    • No mining without consent: No project should receive financing or permits without the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples and genuine consultations with affected communities.
    • No-go zones: States should establish no-go mining zones in ecologically sensitive areas, on land and at sea, and ensure that mining does not cause significant harm to biodiversity.

    What can COP31 do?

    Last year, governments agreed to develop a Just Transition Mechanism, but explicit provisions on transition mineral governance were dropped. At COP31, negotiators are reconsidering the issue. I urge negotiators in Antalya to: 

    • Reflect states’ obligations underpinning the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the UN Secretary-General’s Critical Energy Transition Minerals Panel principles in the Just Transition Work Programme.
    • Keep mineral demand for the military and digital infrastructure separate from demand that serves climate protection.
    • Require traceability and end-use disclosure, so it is publicly known whether a mineral ends up in a battery, a missile or a data centre.
    • Respect the human rights of Indigenous Peoples, peasants and environmental human rights defenders, including the right to say no, protection from reprisals and access to remedy.

    At COP31, transition minerals should be unequivocally linked to everyone’s human right to a safe climate and a healthy environment.

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    Climate Change

    Countries take up industry push to loosen UN carbon market rules at COP31

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    Dozens of countries – from big emerging economies to the world’s poorest nations – are calling for the UN’s new carbon market to reassess climate integrity rules, in a push that campaigners and researchers have blamed on industry lobbying.

    At COP31 talks on the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM) this weekend, the Like-Minded Developing Countries – a group that includes Saudi Arabia, India and China – the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and landlocked developing countries raised concerns about the requirements project developers must meet, according to sources familiar with the closed-door discussions.

    They warned about the cumulative weight of those requirements developed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as barriers to implementation. Several countries, including Singapore and some Latin American states, said rules must keep projects financially viable, while South Korea asked for proportionate requirements, the sources said.

    Their demands closely track arguments from carbon market industry groups, which claim PACM’s conservative approach to counting emission reductions is so strict that few projects will ever come to fruition.

    Industry and NGOs lobby to weaken UN carbon credit rules in “coordinated” push

    In a letter published ahead of COP31, the lobby groups asked governments to “raise implementation concerns” and to request that the Supervisory Body – the UN body that oversees the market – assess the “combined impact” of its rules on the feasibility of projects.

    The letter was signed by the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), a business group whose members include fossil fuel giants Shell, BP, Saudi Aramco and Chevron, along with the Project Developer Forum and the Wildlife Conservation Society, which develops forest conservation programmes.

    Draft text reflects industry demands

    Those demands are reflected in the first draft of the COP31 decision on the mechanism, published late on Saturday. To guard against over-crediting, PACM’s rules deliberately err on the side of issuing fewer credits when emissions cuts from projects are uncertain.

    The document asks the Supervisory Body to look at how these cautious assumptions add up across its rules and what that means for the number of credits, project costs and prices. The aim, it says, is to avoid “excessive compounding of conservative adjustments”.

    Other parts of the draft tell the body not to make its rules too cautious or too rigid. That includes efforts to guard against the risk that carbon captured by a project is later released. Most of these passages add that environmental integrity must be maintained.

    Risk of another ‘failure’

    “Weakening the rules is not climate ambition – it is a license to pollute,” said Erika Lennon, a senior attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). “As we are on the brink of permanently breaching 1.5C, we cannot afford to turn the carbon market into another loophole for polluters,” she added.

    Axel Michaelowa, research director at Perspectives Climate Research, said that if attempts to weaken the rules succeed, it could lead to another failure of an international carbon market. Demand for credits rests on trust, he said, and the slightest doubt over integrity erodes buyers’ willingness to pay.

    Calls to revise requirements “must be supported by scientific evidence, not unsupported claims of under-crediting – especially when these assumptions come from private actors whose revenues depend on the volume of transacted credits rather than real mitigation outcomes,” Michaelowa said.

    The EU, Switzerland and Senegal are among a handful of countries pushing back against demands to re-assess the market rules, according to the sources, and are opposing requests to weigh up the profitability of projects or to lower standards.