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A court in the Netherlands has ruled that the government’s emissions-cutting and adaptation policies discriminated against and failed to protect citizens of the Dutch Caribbean island of Bonaire from climate change, in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

In a case brought by Greenpeace, the Hague District Court ruled the government breached Bonaire islanders’ right to a private and family life and discrimininated against them by drawing up policies to adapt Bonaire to climate change later and less systematically than they did for the European part of the Netherlands, despite the islands being more vulnerable to climate change.

Onnie Emerenciana, a farmer plaintiff in the case and one of the 26,000 residents in the Caribbean island, celebrated the decision, saying that the Dutch government can no longer ignore Bonaire’s islanders.

“The court is drawing a line in the sand,” he said, “our lives, our culture, and our country are being taken seriously. The State can no longer look the other way. The next step is to free up funding and expertise for concrete action plans to protect our island. We truly have to do this together; Bonaire cannot solve this alone.”

The Dutch island is located off the Venezuelan coast in the Southern Caribbean, an area that is highly prone to hurricanes, extreme heat and sea level rise. The World Bank estimates that Bonaire could lose up to 12% of its GDP to tropical storms.

ClientEarth fundamental rights lawyer Vesselina Newman said the judgement was “totally groundbreaking” as “it’s the first successful national adaptation case of this scale. The ruling, based on discrimination against the inhabitants of Bonaire, is significant, and will surely open doors for a host of comparable cases around the world – in particular other Global North countries with overseas territories.”

    To comply with the convention and the Paris Agreement, the court said the government must submit a new binding emissions-cutting target, which includes international aviation and shipping, for 2030 and other interim targets on the way to net zero by 2050. The current 55% on 2019 levels target is non-binding and, as the court noted, the government accepts it is “highly unlikely” to meet it.

    Rebuke to rich nations

    Wealthy nations have argued that their climate targets are compatible with the Paris Agreement goal to limit global warming to 1.5C because they plan to reduce emissions faster than the necessary global average. But the court in The Hague ruled Dutch climate policy “does not make an equitable contribution” to meeting this goal.

    The panel of three judges ruled that the Netherlands has emitted more than its fair share carbon through its historic emissions, and has not explained how it is “equitable” that the country’s climate plan allows for higher emissions per person than the global average.

    The ruling added that, by not including international aviation and shipping, the Dutch and EU emissions reduction targets are “lower than the UN minimum standards” for developed countries.

    Most countries’ climate targets do not include international aviation and shipping, arguing that they should be dealt with globally under the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

    Lawyers Michael Bacon and Emiel Jurjens embrace at the District Court of The Hague (Photo: Marten van Dijl / Greenpeace)

    The judges also criticised the government’s adaptation policies as “there is still no climate adaptation plan or integrated climate adaptation policy for Bonaire, even though it has been known for three decades that the island is particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change”. But it said there was still time for adaptation goals under the UN climate regime, which are mostly for 2030, to be met.

    Judges order review of climate plan

    The ruling gives 18 months to the Dutch government to establish binding targets, enshrined in national legislation, that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the whole economy. It also ordered the government to develop an adaptation plan for Bonaire that can be implemented by 2030.

    Dutch climate minister Sophie Hermans said in a statement that the court delivered a “ruling of significance” and that the government would carefully review it. The ruling could still be appealed.

    The Netherlands has long positioned itself as a climate leader on the global stage and is currently leading a global coalition to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and co-chairing an upcoming conference on phasing out fossil fuels in the Colombian city of Santa Marta.

    After elections in October 2025, the government which will respond to the ruling is likely to be liberal Rob Jetten. He was environment minister in the previous government and personally promoted the launch of the coalition against fossil fuel subsidies at COP28 in 2023. “My message to Rob Jetten : bring this ruling to the cabinet’s negotiating table tonight,” said Greenpeace Netherlands managing director Marieke Vellekoop.

    The court case builds upon the 2024 ruling of the ECHR that the Swiss government breached older Swiss women’s right to a private and family life by not doing enough to cut emissions. Other ECHR members – most of which have similar or less ambitious climate targets and policies to the Netherlands – include most European nations inside and outside of the EU and Turkiye.

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    Court rules Netherlands is not doing enough to meet 1.5C goal and protect Bonaire

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    Q&A: What is the Belém-Antalya mechanism for a ‘just transition’? 

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    One of the key expected outcomes from the upcoming COP31 climate summit in Antalya, Turkey, is the launch of a “just transition mechanism”.

    This follows years of calls from civil society to support a “just transition” as countries shift towards low-emissions energy systems and away from fossil fuels.

    At the COP30 UN climate talks last year in the Brazilian city of Belém parties agreed to establish a “mechanism” to support this goal, called the “Belém-Antalya mechanism” (BAM).

    Groups that have championed the BAM want it to act as a central hub on just transitions, providing support for workers and communities around the world.

    However, the details of exactly what the much-touted BAM will consist of remain vague, with developed and developing countries disagreeing about its functions and purpose.

    Disagreements continued at the UN climate talks in Bonn in June 2026, including on the crucial question of how the BAM will be financed.

    Here, Carbon Brief looks at where the idea for the BAM came from, how it could support just transitions and what to expect from COP31.

    A “just transition” is the idea that workers and communities should be supported in the shift to a low-carbon economy. It is a central principle behind the idea of climate justice.

    Often, the term refers to those linked to the fossil-fuel industry, but it can also refer to transitions taking place in agriculture, heavy industry and various other sectors.

    The concept originated in the 1980s, when US labour unions forged alliances with environmental justice groups. It has since become a key part of international climate discussions.

    The preamble to the 2015 Paris Agreement includes a commitment to “tak[e] into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities”.

    Bert De Wel, policy officer at the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), tells Carbon Brief:

    “The labour movement is very happy with the wide audience and broad political support that the concept has received since its inception in the 1980s. The inclusion in the Paris Agreement, with the reference to the creation of decent work and quality jobs was a milestone for the movement. While other demands have been added…we continue to stress the labour dimension as being central to the concept.”

    Three years after the creation of the Paris Agreement, at COP24 in the former coal-mining city of Katowice, the Polish presidency highlighted the issue of just transitions.

    The need for carbon-cutting policies to ensure “a just transition of the workforce” that creates “decent work and quality jobs” was included in the “Silesia declaration”, issued by the presidency during the first week of COP24.

    While the declaration was only signed by 50 countries – roughly a quarter of the parties at the summit – it was still “noted” in the final COP text.

    This helped to drive momentum behind the idea, culminating in formal agreement at COP27 in Egypt to launch a “work programme on just transition” (JTWP).

    De Wel says the establishment of the JTWP was a “major step forward” that allowed parties to “speak about just transition in more concrete terms”.

    In the years since, negotiators have worked to flesh out the JTWP, with disagreements between parties about what its purpose should be.

    Broadly, developed countries would like it to focus on domestic workforces, while some nations want a more global outlook, including support for transitions in developing countries.

    The JTWP has proved a challenging negotiating space, with talks at the COP29 summit in 2024 closing without an agreement, in what one observer dubbed a “betrayal”.

    However, despite these frustrations, parties at COP30 in Brazil agreed to establish a new institutional mechanism on just transitions, which has become widely known as the BAM. The move was hailed as a “victory” by civil society.

    Where did the ‘just transition mechanism’ come from?

    In the run-up to COP30, civil society began to push for the establishment of an “institutional arrangement” that would move work under the JTWP from talk into action.

    (This was originally called the “Belém action mechanism” by civil society groups, who subsequently updated this to the “Belém-Antalya mechanism” following the outcome at COP30. However, in the JTWP text agreed at COP30 it is only described as a “mechanism”, sometimes also referred to as the “just transition mechanism”.)

    Anabella Rosemberg, senior advisor on just transition at NGO umbrella group Climate Action Network (CAN) International, tells Carbon Brief:

    “The idea of the mechanism emerged from the collaboration of civil society, trade unions, feminist groups, youth and Indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC.

    “It was clear that the kind of activities being run under the JTWP – two dialogues a year and one ministerial – would not support the delivery of just-transition strategies on the ground, so a new approach was developed to get words into action.”

    Following the inception of the idea, civil society did “tonnes of stuff to boost it up the agenda”, Dr Leon Sealey-Huggins, a senior campaigner at the charity War on Want, tells Carbon Brief.

    This ranged from presenting demands and proposals to different constituents, organising joint letters and writing policy papers, all the way through to designing logos, creating memes and even a song.

    These efforts ultimately paid off: during the Bonn climate negotiations in June 2025, one draft text included the idea for a new institutional arrangement. One of the options in the draft text was for a “toolbox, guidance framework, global platform, technical assistance network [or] mechanism”.

    Paragraph 28 of the JTWP text published 25 June 2025. The text reads "28. Options for further implementation of the United Arab Emirates just transition work programme Option 1: Improving existing modalities Option 2: New institutional arrangements [toolbox, guidance framework, global platform, technical assistance network, mechanism] Option 3: Defer decision to 2026"
    Paragraph 28 of the JTWP text published 25 June 2025. Credit: UNFCCC.

    This inclusion was broadly welcomed as a “big win” for civil society groups, although parties acknowledged that more needed to be done to flesh out the idea.

    Going into COP30, civil society groups continued to push the idea of creating a BAM, with protests, banners and badges visible around the venue.

    Early in negotiations, the G77 and China – a large coalition of developing countries at UN climate talks – put forward their own proposal for a just transition “mechanism”. This, they suggested, could provide technical assistance, support international cooperation and help to foster partnerships in an effort to address implementation gaps.

    Their proposal faced initial pushback from developed-country parties including Norway, the UK and others, who opposed it due to concerns that it would duplicate existing systems and require additional funding.

    Developed countries also opposed the use of the term “mechanism”, with the EU suggesting an “action plan” as a potential alternative. Nevertheless, the creation of a “mechanism” was included in the final draft text on the JTWP.

    This text was formally approved during the COP30 closing plenary to extended applause from many in the hall.

    In a statement at the time, Chiara Martinelli, director at CAN Europe, welcomed the decision:

    “Delivering BAM was a major civil society win. It creates a coordinated institutional home to drive forward progress on the just transition.”

    The decision to develop the mechanism included a request for parties to work over the subsequent year – through to COP31 – on a plan to get things started.

    What role could the mechanism play in facilitating ‘just transitions’?

    According to civil society, the BAM could help tackle the fractured just-transition landscape by centralising resources and helping to overcome a number of barriers.

    Speaking to Carbon Brief, Rosemberg says the just-transition space “lacks coordination and the right kind of support and is quite disconnected from climate action imperatives”. She adds:

    “The BAM can play a role in bringing those [people] trying to make just transition happen together, identify gaps and barriers, foster cooperation and accelerate support.”

    Civil society has put forward a number of proposals likely to inform the structure of the BAM. Most consist of a mechanism with three parts, which would encompass and expand upon the work that is currently being carried out under the JTWP.

    One proposal by a coalition of five NGOs suggests the mechanism is formed of a steering body, a “knowledge arm” and an “implementation arm”.

    The steering body would coordinate the work of the two arms of the BAM, including deciding the topics that should be discussed under the ongoing JTWP, which will continue to feature in climate negotiations. They suggest the body would recommend topics that require negotiation when “gaps that require political guidance are identified”.

    Their proposal is illustrated in the infographic below, showing the steering body acting as a central hub for work within the BAM.

    Infographic titled "structure and functions of a Global Just Transition Mechanism"
    Infographic showing a suggested structure and key functions of the just transition mechanism. Credit: Women & Gender Constituency, CAN, DCJ, YOUNGO and TUNGO.

    The final part of the BAM, the “implementation arm”, would act as a hub to enable and coordinate technical, financial and knowledge-based assistance for those pursuing a just transition.

    Rosemberg says the vision of civil society is for work to go “beyond negotiators’ dialogues”. She says the BAM could enable the organisation of a “matchmaking platform” to provide support faster, as well as dedicated groups to identify and mobilise financial resources. She adds:

    “Finally, through bottom-up identification of barriers, the BAM can also allow a discussion on enabling just transition that is informed by practitioners. The BAM can show that implementation does not necessarily mean taking issues outside of the UNFCCC.”

    A separate proposal for the structure of the BAM from the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ) – a separate coalition of NGOs – similarly proposes three elements. These would be: coordination and coherence; knowledge generation; and international cooperation and support.

    Sealey-Huggins, who is affiliated with DCJ, notes:

    “If it works in practice, what we’ll see is a cascade of just-transition policies implemented across countries, across sectors in a unifying, transformational moment for justice-centered climate action, and that will be the key to unlocking the transition that’s been missing so far.”

    Another proposal for the BAM comes from the Grantham Institute at the London School of Economics. It suggests the three functions of the mechanism should be capacity-building, technical assistance and knowledge-sharing, but it recommends a dual-arm structure comprising a policy arm and an operational arm.

    De Wel tells Carbon Brief that while there is “rather broad consensus on the functions”, parties are pushing in “very different directions” on how the BAM will be set up.

    What are the financial implications of the mechanism?

    Within UN climate negotiations, some parties have raised concerns about the potential cost of the mechanism.

    The push to launch the BAM comes at a time when the UNFCCC itself is facing a funding gap, following the US withdrawal. Several other parties have also delayed or reduced their contributions, in response to changes in domestic priorities.

    This has led to the UNFCCC cancelling events and not filling vacated positions, as the organisation struggles to carry out its existing functions.

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    As such, some parties have expressed hesitancy about creating another mechanism under the remit of the UNFCCC, which also requires funding. However, proponents of the BAM argue that the costs of running it would be minimal.

    Rosemberg tells Carbon Brief that the BAM represents “an opportunity to streamline and make efficient use of public resources”. She adds:

    “The mechanism does not necessarily require the creation of a costly new institution. Instead, it can leverage existing climate-finance channels and philanthropy.”

    She adds that a “similar body” to the potential mechanism, the Climate Technology Centre and Network, costs less than $10m a year. Rosemberg notes that this is “not an impossible amount to be found if there is political will to make just transition happen”.

    De Wel n