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2024年5月,尽管用电需求持续增长,清洁能源发电量占到中国全国总发电量的44%,创下历史新高;燃煤发电量占比降至53%,达到历史低点。

基于官方数据和其他数据,Carbon Brief 的新分析揭示了煤炭在能源结构中占比下降的真实程度。

2023年5月,煤炭在中国发电量中所占比例为60%。一年后,这一数字下降了7个百分点。

该分析揭示的其他关键信息包括:

  • 国家统计局按发电方式分列的月度发电量数据现在对风能和太阳能发电量计入非常有局限性。例如,它未纳入“分布式”屋顶光伏和较小的集中式太阳能发电站,因此只能捕捉到约一半的太阳能发电量。
  • 国家统计局的月度总发电量为718太瓦时(TWh),而国家能源局报告提出月度电力需求为775太瓦时,两者的差距显著。实际上,由于发电厂和电网损耗,发电量肯定应高于需求量。
  • 媒体报道曾猜测,创纪录的新增可再生能源装机容量会在5月份触及电网上限,但新数据显示情况并非如此。
  • 2024年5月,中国电力需求同比增长49太瓦时(7.2%)。
  • 与此同时,清洁能源发电量创纪录地增长了78太瓦时,其中太阳能发电量创纪录地增长了41太瓦时(78%),水力发电量从早些时候干旱造成的低点回升了34太瓦时(39%),风力发电量小幅增长了4太瓦时(5%)。
  • 随着清洁能源的增长超过电力需求增长,化石燃料发电量被迫回落,出现了自2019年新冠大流行以来最大的月度降幅。天然气发电量下降了4太瓦时(16%),燃煤发电量下降了16太瓦时(4%)。
  • 化石燃料发电量的下降意味着电力行业的CO2排放量下降了3.6%,而电力行业的CO2排放量约占中国温室气体排放总量的五分之二,是近年来排放增长的主要来源。
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从2024年3月开始,中国化石燃料和水泥行业的CO2排放量由增变减。新的研究结果表明,这一趋势仍在继续。

如果目前风能和太阳能的快速部署得以继续,那么中国的CO2排放量很可能会继续下降,从而使2023年成为中国碳达峰的一年。

月度数据差异

国家统计局每月都会公布中国按发电方式分列的发电量数据。2024年5月的数据是在近一个月前的6月中旬公布,并被广泛报道。

然而,这些数据的局限性越来越大,因为其中不包括“分布式”光伏电站,如家庭和企业屋顶上安装的光伏系统。本文的分析表明,这使得大约一半的太阳能发电总量被遗漏。

如果仔细审视用电量,国家统计局发电量数据不完整这一事实显而易见:国家能源局报告的5月份用电量为775太瓦时,而国家统计局报告的发电量仅为718太瓦时。实际上,由于发电厂和输电过程中的损耗,发电量肯定远远大于用电量。

国家统计局报告的太阳能和风能发电量似乎很少,这引起了人们的困惑,并导致有报道声称中国的风能和太阳能发电表现不佳。

中电联收集的“利用率”数据可跟踪风能和太阳能发电的表现,显示相对于最大潜力的实际出力。这些数据通常包含在国家能源局发布的月度统计数据中。

国家能源局因在5月份发布的数据中略过了利用率,这导致彭博社和路透社猜测背后原因可能是风能和太阳能数据不佳。这一猜测在中电联直接提供其数据后基本被证明不成立,因为太阳能发电利用率大幅上升;风能利用率虽然下降,但在正常的年度变化范围内。

另一个数据集追踪了由于电网灵活性低而浪费的太阳能和风能发电量的比例,结果显示两者分别小幅增长了0.8和1.7个百分点。这对电厂运营者来说是个问题,但该升幅远未达到会显著影响利用率的程度——消纳率的年际变化幅度通常超过5%。

现在有足够的数据来破解国家统计局发电数据的局限性,并描绘出中国5月份发电结构的全貌。

首先值得一提的是,国家统计局的数据是以30天为一个月进行归一化处理的,这造成了部分数据不匹配。本文剩余部分使用归一化后的30天数据。

除了使用国家统计局数据,还可根据报告的装机容量和利用率来估算太阳能和风能发电量。通过将这些估计值与其他技术的报告发电量相结合,得出总发电量为783太瓦时,同比增长8%。

报告的750太瓦时用电量(按30天为一个月进行归一化)与估计的783太瓦时发电量相符,另有4.2%的差异是由于传输损耗造成的。

目前尚无输电损耗的月度数据,但2023年的平均值为4.5%,与报告的用电量和预估发电量之间的差距非常吻合。

创纪录的结果

综合各种数据可以看出,2024年5月太阳能发电量创纪录地增长了78%,远高于不完整的国家统计局数据中29%的同比增幅。

太阳能发电装机容量增加52%至691吉瓦(gigawatt),产能利用率从16%提高到19%,太阳能发电量从2023年5月的53太瓦时增至2024年5月的94太瓦时,增加了41太瓦时,创下中国各发电方式发电量中最大的增幅。

水电发电量的增幅位居第二,虽然发电量仅增长了1%,但利用率却从31%跃升至41%,因为该行业正从2022年至2023年创纪录的干旱中恢复过来。这使得水电发电量增加了39%(34太瓦时),达到115太瓦时。

风电装机大幅增长了21%,但其利用率却有所下降,这可能是由于风力条件逐月变化所致。因此,发电量的增幅相对较小,仅为5%(4太瓦时),达到83太瓦时。核电和生物质发电的发电量也有小幅增长,但核电站的利用率从87%下降到85%。

如下图所示,清洁能源发电量总计增长了78太瓦时。这足以超过49太瓦时的需求增长。

因此,尽管燃气发电装机增加了9%,但发电量却大幅下降16%,利用率急剧下降了24%。燃煤发电装机增加了3%,但发电量却下降了3.7%,平均利用率下降了7%。需求下降可能会抑制过去两年火热的对新建煤炭产能的投资。

燃煤和燃气发电量的变化,加之燃煤电厂热耗率的轻微下降,意味着电力行业的CO2排放量下降了3.6%。

2016-2024 年中国每月发电量同比变化 (terawatt hours)。 根据 WIND Information 上中国电力企业联合会报告的容量和利用率计算出风能、太阳能发电量, 和按燃料划分的火力发电明细;根据国家统计局每月发布的数据计算出火电总发电量和其他发电来源的总量。 Carbon Brief制图。
2016-2024 年中国每月发电量同比变化 (terawatt hours)。 根据 WIND Information 上中国电力企业联合会报告的容量和利用率计算出风能、太阳能发电量, 和按燃料划分的火力发电明细;根据国家统计局每月发布的数据计算出火电总发电量和其他发电来源的总量。 Carbon Brief制图。

在发电量发生上述变化后,中国的发电结构在2024年5月已大幅减少了对化石燃料的依赖。如下图所示,燃煤发电份额从去年同期的60%降至53%,是有记录以来的最低份额。

与此同时,太阳能发电占比从去年同期的7%上升到12%,创历史最高纪录。其余为风电(11%)、水电(15%)、核电(5%)、天然气发电(3%)和生物质发电(2%)。

2016-2024年发电量份额 (%)。Carbon Brief 制图。根据 WIND Information 上中国电力企业联合会报告的容量和利用率计算出风能、太阳能发电量, 和按燃料划分的火力发电明细;根据国家统计局每月发布的数据计算出火电总发电量和其他发电来源的总量。 Carbon Brief制图。
2016-2024年发电量份额 (%)。Carbon Brief 制图。根据 WIND Information 上中国电力企业联合会报告的容量和利用率计算出风能、太阳能发电量, 和按燃料划分的火力发电明细;根据国家统计局每月发布的数据计算出火电总发电量和其他发电来源的总量。 Carbon Brief制图。

非化石能源的总体份额达到创纪录的44%,间歇性可再生能源(太阳能和风能)的比例也创下新高,达到23%。

如上图所示,尽管需求不断增长,但太阳能和风能在中国电力结构中的份额正在迅速增加。2016年5月,它们仅占总量的7%。

与此同时,2024年5月,清洁能源发电装机继续强劲增长,新增太阳能发电装机19吉瓦 ,风电3吉瓦 ,核电1.2吉瓦。

在2024年的前五个月,中国新增了约79吉瓦的太阳能和20吉瓦的风能。如下图所示,这两个新增发电装机数字比去年分别增长了29%和21%,而去年的数字已经创下历史新高。

就太阳能发电具体而言,2024年5月的月新增装机高于4月,与2023年5月相比也有同比增长。

每年从一月份风电和太阳能的累计新增发电装机容量 (gigawatts)。根据国家能源局每月发布的数据。 Carbon Brief制图。
每年从一月份风电和太阳能的累计新增发电装机容量 (gigawatts)。根据国家能源局每月发布的数据。 Carbon Brief制图。

太阳能发电量的快速增长表明,太阳能产能的激增正在提供新的电力供应,其规模足以满足中国大部分的需求增长。

这进一步印证了中国的CO2排放量正处于结构性下降时期的观点。

如果清洁能源的新增装机保持在2023年和2024年初的水平,那么CO2排放量可能会持续下降,这将确定2023年是中国实现碳达峰的一年。

由于中国将在明年初宣布新的气候目标,政府对清洁能源增长的雄心水平仍有待观察。

关于数据

风能和太阳能发电量,以及按燃料划分的火电发电量系通过将每月末的发电装机乘月利用率计算得出,数据来自万得金融终端提供的中电联报告数据。

火电、水电和核电的总发电量来源于国家统计局的月度发布数据。由于无法获得生物质发电的月度利用率数据,因此采用2023年的年平均利用率52%。

发电产生的碳排放量估算基于中国最新的2018年国家温室气体排放清单中的排放因子,以及国家能源局公布的燃煤电厂月平均热耗率,并假设燃气电厂平均热耗率为50%。

The post 分析:中国清洁能源发展使五月燃煤发电份额降至53%的历史低点 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

分析:中国清洁能源发展使五月燃煤发电份额降至53%的历史低点

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Climate Change

“Next year is too late for regulations”: Beetaloo Energy’s 2GW gas-powered AI data centre a “disaster proposal” destined to cause climate chaos

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SYDNEY, Wednesday 22 July 2026 — Beetaloo Energy has secured land from the NT Government for a massive $40 billion “hyperscale” AI data centre near Darwin, which would be powered by 2 gigawatts (GW) of gas power fracked directly from the Beetaloo basin, prompting calls from Greenpeace for urgent federal legislation.

The proposal marks a dangerous escalation in the AI data centre industry’s expansion, which threatens to entrench fossil fuel infrastructure for decades and put immense pressure on the region’s fragile water resources — while continuing to be unregulated.

Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “This disaster proposal for a 2GW gas-powered AI data centre in the NT is a shocking example of the unchecked expansion of hyperscale data centres in Australia. It is also, critically, more evidence for the urgent need for a moratorium on all new data centres until strong, binding regulations are put in place to protect our communities and climate.

This proposal mirrors the frenzied, unchecked expansion currently wreaking havoc on communities in the US. We are seeing cowboy data centre operators treat Australia like a playground, steam-rolling ahead with projects that would lock down precious water resources and spike emissions, despite the overwhelming community opposition.

Every day, more councils, communities and environmental groups are joining Greenpeace’s call for a moratorium on data centres, yet as of today there is still no system of safeguards or rules in place to regulate these companies.  

While Beetaloo Energy and the NT Government prepare to bulldoze ahead with this climate and water disaster, the Prime Minister is asleep at the wheel, promising to legislate a vague set of standards next year.

Next year is too late, and anything less than mandating data centres cover their own energy demand, and then some, with new renewable energy is not enough.” 

-ENDS-

Media contact

Lucy Keller on 0491 135 308 or lucy.keller@greenpeace.org

“Next year is too late for regulations”: Beetaloo Energy’s 2GW gas-powered AI data centre a “disaster proposal” destined to cause climate chaos

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Climate Change

Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise

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Reports of human rights and environmental abuses linked to Chinese companies’ overseas investments in the mining and refining of minerals needed for the clean energy transition are on the rise, research by a monitoring group has found.

The number of recorded allegations of harm at projects tied to Chinese firms have increased every year since 2021, rising to 148 in 2025, according to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC). On Wednesday it released new data showing that a total of 434 allegations of abuse were made against Chinese-backed projects over the five-year period in projects across the world.

The world’s top cleantech manufacturer, China is also the leading financier of critical minerals projects worldwide. The country has committed more than $120 billion in foreign direct investment into mineral mining and processing since 2023, Australian think-tank Climate Energy Finance recently found.

“China plays a central role in global transition mineral supply chains, and as such has a unique opportunity to raise the bar on human rights and community engagement at every stage of mining,” said Michael Clements, BHRC’s executive director.

“While there have been encouraging developments, from stronger regulations to more company engagement, there remains a gap between human rights commitment and action,” he said.

The report comes as communities affected by Chinese-backed mineral projects have filed the first two cases to a Beijing-based mediation mechanism intended to bring willing Chinese companies to the discussion table with affected communities.

Allegations of harms on the rise

BHRC’s latest analysis – including data for the period 2023-2025 – covered mining, smelting and refining projects for 11 minerals considered key to manufacturing clean energy technologies such as batteries, EVs and solar panels needed to move away from climate-heating fossil fuels.

The highest number of abuses was recorded in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of nickel, which is used to make EV batteries. After the Indonesian government banned exports of raw nickel, Chinese firms invested billions of dollars to develop a large-scale nickel smelting and processing industry in the Southeast Asian country, largely powered by coal.

Other countries with a high number of recorded harms include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Chinese firms dominate cobalt and copper production; Myanmar, where unregulated rare earths mining has caused widespread environmental destruction; Serbia, where Chinese-backed mining of some of Europe’s most significant copper and gold deposits is swallowing land and homes, and Zimbabwe, where Chinese investments have turned the nation into Africa’s top lithium producer.

Growing risks for people and nature

Allegations tracked by BHRC included negative impacts on local livelihoods, health and land rights, workers’ health and safety and work-related deaths, as well as water pollution and environmental contamination. In addition, 18 people were attacked for raising concerns about Chinese transition mineral projects between 2023 and 2025.

The report shows that 10 Chinese companies, including Zijin Mining, Tsingshan Group and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, accounted for nearly two-thirds of all allegations recorded in the last five years. It found that some Chinese companies “still appear to turn a blind eye to these issues” but noted that several others have been more responsive to allegations of abuse. However, even among companies with human rights policies, implementation remains a challenge, BHRC warned.

    Zijin Mining and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt repeatedly responded to the allegations of harm by saying they take environmental and social risks seriously and adhere to international standards. Tsingshan Group never responded to BHRC’s requests for comment.

    Platform for dialogue between communities and Chinese firms

    At the same time, Chinese authorities have made “significant progress” on introducing a more specific framework for managing environmental and social risks in overseas investment, BHRC said.

    This includes global consultation on a draft Sustainable Mining Code, adherence to UN guiding principles on business and human rights, and greater emphasis on oversight of companies operating overseas.

    The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) set up a mediation and consultation mechanism intended to provide a platform for dialogue between affected communities or civil society groups that have raised concerns and Chinese companies.

    More than three years since its launch, the mechanism has now received its first two complaints from local communities and many more are considering filing a case, Margaux Day, executive director at the nonprofit Accountability Counsel, told an event hosted by Climate Home News last month.

    “This is incredibly exciting in that it fills a governance and accountability gap where often communities who are seeking to protect their rights and the environment can’t reach someone who will respond to them,” she told the panel discussion at London Climate Action Week.

    Climate Home News understands that the complaints were filed by communities in Latin America and Southeast Asia over labour rights and resettlement issues. No information about the cases has yet been made public. The mechanism’s secretariat did not respond to Climate Home News’ questions.

    The mechanism was set up after the Chinese regulator for banks and insurers called on investor-level institutions to establish complaints bodies to hear from communities outside of China. But whether the new initiative will prove effective in tackling grievances remains an open question.

    “Real potential” for better mining practices

    Participation in the mechanism is voluntary for Chinese firms and it doesn’t have a fact-finding function, nor can it impose provisions for compensation or compliance with human rights standards.

    But Day told Climate Home News that, if successful, it could bring companies to negotiate an outcome that is better for people and the planet and leads to more sustainable mining practice.

    Chen Yu, an independent China advisor for campaign group Global Witness, agreed that the mechanism holds “real potential”.

    “There exists nothing else at a similar level to promote dialogue between communities and Chinese mining companies in particular,” she said.

    For companies, the mechanism opens “a channel for problem-solving and dialogue with communities”, she added, as “Chinese companies often remain cautious of approaching affected communities directly, afraid of making the problem bigger”.

    However, Chen said the mechanism remains at an early stage of development, faces resourcing challenges and is not yet sufficiently understood by communities in mining areas or Chinese firms.

    To help it address some of these challenges, the secretariat is currently seeking technical support from a range of organisations, including civil society groups. But, Chen said, “it will take time for the mechanism to show its value”.

    The post Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture

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    Andreas Sieber is head of political strategy at 350.0g. Cat Abreu is director of the International Climate Politics Hub.

    From the US abduction of Venezuela’s president at the start of this year to the Iran war which rumbles on, disruption is the new normal for global geopolitics, more often than not linked to conflict over supplies of oil and gas. 

    Events so far in 2026 – driven largely by the desire of the Trump administration to grab control of fossil fuels around the world – show that the climate community’s approach to energy diplomacy will have to evolve if we are to operate effectively and push for climate action in such a volatile landscape.

    Today’s climate and energy governance must be able to cope with trade wars, genocide, fascism, spiralling inequality and challenges to multilateralism. The increasingly dominant paradigms of economic competitiveness, energy security and green industrialisation can help drive the transition but they also challenge our collective mission to deliver an equitable green shift.

    US-China rivalry dominates

    Longer-term geopolitical trends that are seeing power move from West to East and North to South have fuelled a US–China “superpower rivalry”, which is pulling the global economy apart and reining in trade.

    A key question will be how the fracture “lines” are drawn: by the US and China, or also by other countries or blocs? Many governments will try to remain “in the middle” between the two giants to capture economic gains from both sides. Yet despite the language of “strategic autonomy”, Washington and Beijing may be in a position to force choices via market access, export controls and sanctions.

      At first glance, this may not seem particularly relevant for climate and energy politics. But Huawei’s exclusion from 5G operations across the political West and India following the so-called Clean Network Campaign by the US government serves as a warning of what could happen to climate green tech.

      And the recent debate to cut out Chinese inverters from European markets follows the same pattern – US security forces perceive a risk and start encouraging their allies to drop Chinese technology.

      The new drivers: competition and security

      Despite this fracturing geopolitical and economic context, energy transition is still happening. To ensure it is effective and equitable, we need to understand what is driving it and how to adapt climate politics so that it better responds to these drivers.

      Put simply, China is supplying the world with low-cost renewables (roughly 60% of critical wind and 80% of solar components), batteries, EVs and other key elements. Other countries now also want their piece of the green tech pie and are forming industrial policies to get it.

      It is this new competitiveness-driven logic that will shape the quest for decarbonisation, which has shifted from cooperating around the cost of tackling climate change to rivalry for the benefits of climate action.

      Over 90% of new renewables projects are now cheaper than fossil alternatives. Gas-fired power is 3–4 times more expensive than solar and wind. In 2015, most decarbonisation policies were “traditional” emissions-cutting strategies like carbon pricing or net zero dates, whereas green industrial policies now underpin the majority.

      Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister

      Meanwhile, security has become a central driver of energy politics. We are living through the second major fossil fuel crisis in just four years. Elevated oil and gas prices will impose up to $1 trillion in additional costs on the global economy by the end of the year if disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz. Fossil fuel supply chains have exposed countries to conflict, coercion and brutal price shocks.

      Fossil fuel volatility destabilises whole economies – higher fuel costs drive up food prices, increase political instability, and push millions into poverty and hunger. This incentivises governments to shield themselves from global shocks, especially in countries that are net fossil fuel importers and home to roughly three-quarters of the world’s population. 

      Yet security fears can cut both ways. The same instability that makes fossil fuel dependence untenable is also sharpening concern over China’s dominance of critical clean technologies and supply chains.

      Equity, cooperation and the opportunity for change

      Developing countries benefit from the rapid uptake of renewables enabled by low-cost Chinese technologies. But significant fiscal space and public investment is needed for the electricity grids and infrastructure required to fully unleash the energy transition, as well as for green industrialisation to diversify revenue streams.

      Despite this, industrial-scale domestic production and ownership often remain out of reach for too many countries that lack the fiscal space to allow green supply chains to flourish and compete with their traditional industrial base. But more just and diversified green tech supply chains could be achieved with concomitant support.

      Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?

      For the first time in decades, the international order is being substantially reshaped. If within this context, decarbonisation is increasingly driven by green industrial policy, energy security and competitiveness, the climate policy community must better anticipate where these debates are moving. We must speak the same language, and enter the forums where decisions are made, including security, trade and bilateral or trilateral spaces.

      We should build on an enlightened self interest recognising that cooperation remains essential and beneficial. This includes using the UN climate process differently: less as an ever-expanding negotiation machine, and more as a space for norm-setting, political alignment and deal-making. In an age of fragmentation, effective cooperation must not only be framed as necessary but thought of as a strategically compelling source of resilience and shared advantage.

      The post Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture appeared first on Climate Home News.

      Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture

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