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The perception of how the land surface releases carbon dioxide (CO2) typically conjures up images of large-scale deforestation or farmers churning up the soil.

However, there is an intriguing – and underappreciated – role played by the world’s rivers.

Right now, plants and soils absorb about one-third of the CO2 released by human activity, similar to how much the oceans take up.

Over thousands to millions of years, some of this land-fixed carbon can end up being buried in sediments, where it eventually forms rocks.

The waters that feed rivers flow through plants, soils and rocks in landscapes, picking up and releasing carbon as they go.

This process is generally considered to be a sideways “leakage” of the carbon that is being taken up by recent plant growth.

However, the age of this carbon – how long it resided in plants and soils before it made it into rivers and then to the atmosphere – has remained a mystery.

If the carbon being released by rivers is young, then it can be considered a component of relatively quick carbon cycling.

However, if the carbon is old, then it is coming from landscape carbon stores that we thought were stable – and, therefore, represents a way these old carbon stores can be destabilised.

In our new study, published in Nature, we show that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from these older sources.

In total, this means the world’s rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – more than the annual fossil-fuel emissions from North America.

This means that there is a significant leak of carbon from old stores that we thought were safely locked away.

Previous work has shown that local land-use change, such as deforestation and climate-driven permafrost thaw, will directly release old carbon into rivers. Whether this is happening at the global scale remains a significant unknown for now.

Who are you calling old?

How do you tell how old carbon is? We employ the same technique that is used to determine the age of an archaeological relic or to verify the age of a vintage wine – that is, radiocarbon dating.

Radiocarbon is the radioactive isotope of carbon, which decays at a known rate. This enables us to determine the age of carbon-based materials dating back to a maximum age of about 60,000 years old.

We know that some of the carbon that rivers release is very young, a product of recent CO2 uptake by plants.

We also know that rivers can receive carbon from much older sources, such as the decomposition of deep soils by microbes and soil organisms or the weathering and erosion of ancient carbon in rocks.

Soil decomposition can release carbon ranging from a few years to tens of thousands of years. An example of very old soil carbon release is from thawing permafrost.

Rock weathering and erosion releases carbon that is millions of years old. This is sometimes referred to as “radiocarbon-dead” because it is so old all the radiocarbon has decayed.

Rivers are emitting old carbon

In our new study, we compile new and existing radiocarbon dates of the CO2 emissions from around 700 stretches of river around the world.

We find that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from older sources (hundreds to thousands of years old, or older), such as old soil and ancient rock carbon.

In the figure below, we suggest how different processes taking place within a landscape can release carbon of different ages into rivers, driving its direct emission to the atmosphere.

Diagram representing the processes that drive young (decadal) and old (millennial and petrogenic) CO2 emissions from rivers. Values are given as petagrams of carbon, equivalent to billions of tonnes. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)

So, while rivers are leaking some modern carbon from plants and soils as part of the landscape processes that remove CO2 from the atmosphere, rivers are also leaking carbon from much older landscape carbon stores.

One major implication of this finding is that modern plants and soils are leaking less carbon back to the atmosphere than previously thought, making them more important for mitigating human-caused climate change.

We find that the proportion of old carbon contributing to river emissions varies across different ecosystems and the underlying geology of the landscapes they drain.

In the figure below, we show that landscapes underlain by sedimentary rocks, which are the most likely to contain substantial ancient (or “petrogenic”) carbon, also had the oldest river emissions. We also show that the type of ecosystem (biome) was also important, although the patterns were less clear.

Radiocarbon content (age) of river carbon emissions in different ecosystems (“Biome”) and in landscapes underlain by different geology (“Lithology”). The lower the amount of radiocarbon (F14Catm), the older the age. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)
Radiocarbon content (age) of river carbon emissions in different ecosystems (“Biome”) and in landscapes underlain by different geology (“Lithology”). The lower the amount of radiocarbon (F14Catm), the older the age. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)

What is obvious is that at least some old carbon was common across most of the rivers we observed, regardless of size and location.

We provide evidence that there is a geological control on river emissions. And the variability in the ecosystem also indicates important controlling factors, such as soil characteristics, vegetation type and climate – especially rainfall patterns and temperature which are known to impact the rate of carbon release from soils and rock weathering.

Are old carbon stores stable?

Long-term carbon storage in soils and rocks is an important process regulating global climate.

For example, the UK’s peatlands are important for regulating climate because they can store carbon for thousands of years. That is why restoring peatlands is such a great climate solution.

Rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – that’s equivalent to about 10-20% of the global emissions from fossil fuel burning annually.

If 60% of river carbon emissions are coming from old carbon stores, then this constitutes a significant leak of carbon from old stores we thought were safely locked away.

Another major implication of our study is that these old carbon stores can be mobilised and routed directly to the atmosphere by rivers, which would exacerbate climate change if these stores are further destabilised.

As can be seen in the figure below, we found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s (lower F14Catm means older radiocarbon ages).

We found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s.

While there are several caveats to interpreting this trend, it is a warning sign that human activities, especially climate change, could intensify the release of carbon to the atmosphere via rivers.

Given the strong link between soil carbon and river emissions, if this trend is a sign of human activity disturbing the global carbon cycle, it is likely due to landscape disturbance mobilising soil carbon.

The age of carbon emissions from rivers appears to be getting older since measurements began in the early 1990s. Icons show dissolved inorganic carbon (grey dots), CO2 (orange squares) and methane (grey crosses). The dashed horizontal line indicates F14Catm = 1.0, for which F14C content is in equilibrium with atmospheric levels in the year of sample collection. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)
The age of carbon emissions from rivers appears to be getting older since measurements began in the early 1990s. Icons show dissolved inorganic carbon (grey dots), CO2 (orange squares) and methane (grey crosses). The dashed horizontal line indicates F14Catm = 1.0, for which F14C content is in equilibrium with atmospheric levels in the year of sample collection. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)

Using rivers to monitor global soil carbon storage

Rivers collect waters from across the landscapes they flow through and therefore provide a tool to track processes happening out of sight.

A drop of water landing in a landscape travels through soils and rock before reaching the river, and its chemistry, including its radiocarbon age, reflects the processes occurring within the landscape.

Monitoring the age of carbon in rivers can therefore tell you a lot about whether their landscapes are storing or releasing carbon.

This has been shown to help identify carbon loss in degraded tropical peatlands, thawing Arctic permafrost and due to deforestation.

River radiocarbon is sensitive to environmental change and could therefore be a powerful monitoring tool for detecting the onset of climate tipping points or the success of landscape restoration projects, for example.

While we present data spread out across the world, there are quite a few gaps for important regions, notably where glacier change is happening and others where droughts and flood frequencies are changing.

These include areas with low amounts of data in Greenland, the African continent, the Arctic and Boreal zones, the Middle East, eastern Europe, western Russia, Central Asia, Australasia and South America outside of the Amazon.

All these regions have the potential to store carbon in the long-term and we do not yet know if these carbon stores are stable or not under present and future climate change.

River radiocarbon offers a powerful method to keep tabs on the health of global ecosystems both now and into the future.

The post Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon

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Climate Change

Minerals for the planet or for war and AI? COP31 must make clear what we prioritise

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Elisa Morgera is the UN Special Rapporteur on Climate Change and Human Rights.

For years, governments and international financial institutions have justified the mining boom by arguing that the energy transition cannot happen without critical minerals.

Increasingly, however, they are securing those minerals for something else: weapons and artificial intelligence (AI).

At COP31, governments must make clear what a sustainable and fair energy transition requires and reject demand for minerals that fuels war and other climate-harming uses. 

Independent research shows that mineral demand is increasingly driven by AI and militarisation. Yet, both undermine climate action.

Major armed conflicts are linked to fossil fuel expansion, generate emissions that are unaccounted for under the Paris Agreement, and deliver record profits to fossil fuel and petrochemical companies through price spikes and disrupted access to fuel and food.

Meanwhile, AI infrastructure risks undoing the progress of the renewable energy transition by driving fossil fuel expansion to meet data centres’ vast new energy demand.

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the head of UN Climate Change Simon Stiell have both warned of the climate harm of unchecked, fossil fuel-powered AI and data centre growth.

    In addition, AI equipment and infrastructure require huge amounts of copper – one of the minerals most in demand for the energy transition. A recent academic study found that copper makes up roughly 82-83% of the mineral mass in data centres.

    None of this demand serves the energy transition. Instead, the climate case for mining is being used to legitimise uses that undermine a sustainable future.

    Mining still relies heavily on fossil fuels and often harms the environment, so it must be limited to extracting the resources strictly necessary for the energy transition. Otherwise, states breach their binding obligations to protect the environment and human rights, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made clear. 

    National security is the new mining fast track

    Campaigners have long warned that when minerals become a matter of national security, governments are more tempted to deregulate and fast-track mining projects. Communities pay the price.

    Extraction without adequate consultation is a global pattern linked to killings of land and environmental defenders. More than half of transition mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous lands, and allegations of abuses linked to mining transition minerals surged 73% in 2025 alone.

    Security and climate are not separate problems. Both are rooted in the fossil fuel-based global economy, now joined by the unchecked growth of AI and data centres.

    Who should benefit from minerals?

    Not every demand for minerals can or should be met. Minerals are finite and must be used to address the worsening climate crisis as a priority.

    The COP31 presidency’s push for electrification will have significant implications for mineral demand. At the same time, electrification doesn’t necessarily help to phase out fossil fuels. Governments must be clear about how minerals are being used and prioritise uses that genuinely advance the energy transition.

    • Climate action comes first: Mineral demand for the wind and solar projects that power communities and essential public services such as local food systems should be met first. Priority uses should include community-led wind and solar projects and renewable power for public transport.
    • No support for climate-harming activities: Mineral demand projections for the energy transition should exclude the military-industrial complex and data centres, and governments should reconsider public spending on militarisation. Mineral demand for electrification should also be scrutinised to avoid deepening fossil fuel dependence.
    • Cut demand before expanding supply: High-consuming countries should use less primary material through efficiency, longer-lasting products and by reducing car dependence, rather than exporting waste and harm to the Global South.
    • Prioritise energy needs: Those without access to energy must be served first. Overproduction and overconsumption must be curbed, otherwise the transition will neither mitigate climate change nor reduce poverty.
    • No mining without consent: No project should receive financing or permits without the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples and genuine consultations with affected communities.
    • No-go zones: States should establish no-go mining zones in ecologically sensitive areas, on land and at sea, and ensure that mining does not cause significant harm to biodiversity.

    What can COP31 do?

    Last year, governments agreed to develop a Just Transition Mechanism, but explicit provisions on transition mineral governance were dropped. At COP31, negotiators are reconsidering the issue. I urge negotiators in Antalya to: 

    • Reflect states’ obligations underpinning the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the UN Secretary-General’s Critical Energy Transition Minerals Panel principles in the Just Transition Work Programme.
    • Keep mineral demand for the military and digital infrastructure separate from demand that serves climate protection.
    • Require traceability and end-use disclosure, so it is publicly known whether a mineral ends up in a battery, a missile or a data centre.
    • Respect the human rights of Indigenous Peoples, peasants and environmental human rights defenders, including the right to say no, protection from reprisals and access to remedy.

    At COP31, transition minerals should be unequivocally linked to everyone’s human right to a safe climate and a healthy environment.

    The post Minerals for the planet or for war and AI? COP31 must make clear what we prioritise appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    Climate Change

    Countries take up industry push to loosen UN carbon market rules at COP31

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    Dozens of countries – from big emerging economies to the world’s poorest nations – are calling for the UN’s new carbon market to reassess climate integrity rules, in a push that campaigners and researchers have blamed on industry lobbying.

    At COP31 talks on the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM) this weekend, the Like-Minded Developing Countries – a group that includes Saudi Arabia, India and China – the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and landlocked developing countries raised concerns about the requirements project developers must meet, according to sources familiar with the closed-door discussions.

    They warned about the cumulative weight of those requirements developed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as barriers to implementation. Several countries, including Singapore and some Latin American states, said rules must keep projects financially viable, while South Korea asked for proportionate requirements, the sources said.

    Their demands closely track arguments from carbon market industry groups, which claim PACM’s conservative approach to counting emission reductions is so strict that few projects will ever come to fruition.

    Industry and NGOs lobby to weaken UN carbon credit rules in “coordinated” push

    In a letter published ahead of COP31, the lobby groups asked governments to “raise implementation concerns” and to request that the Supervisory Body – the UN body that oversees the market – assess the “combined impact” of its rules on the feasibility of projects.

    The letter was signed by the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), a business group whose members include fossil fuel giants Shell, BP, Saudi Aramco and Chevron, along with the Project Developer Forum and the Wildlife Conservation Society, which develops forest conservation programmes.

    Draft text reflects industry demands

    Those demands are reflected in the first draft of the COP31 decision on the mechanism, published late on Saturday. To guard against over-crediting, PACM’s rules deliberately err on the side of issuing fewer credits when emissions cuts from projects are uncertain.

    The document asks the Supervisory Body to look at how these cautious assumptions add up across its rules and what that means for the number of credits, project costs and prices. The aim, it says, is to avoid “excessive compounding of conservative adjustments”.

    Other parts of the draft tell the body not to make its rules too cautious or too rigid. That includes efforts to guard against the risk that carbon captured by a project is later released. Most of these passages add that environmental integrity must be maintained.

    Risk of another ‘failure’

    “Weakening the rules is not climate ambition – it is a license to pollute,” said Erika Lennon, a senior attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). “As we are on the brink of permanently breaching 1.5C, we cannot afford to turn the carbon market into another loophole for polluters,” she added.

    Axel Michaelowa, research director at Perspectives Climate Research, said that if attempts to weaken the rules succeed, it could lead to another failure of an international carbon market. Demand for credits rests on trust, he said, and the slightest doubt over integrity erodes buyers’ willingness to pay.

    Calls to revise requirements “must be supported by scientific evidence, not unsupported claims of under-crediting – especially when these assumptions come from private actors whose revenues depend on the volume of transacted credits rather than real mitigation outcomes,” Michaelowa said.

    The EU, Switzerland and Senegal are among a handful of countries pushing back against demands to re-assess the market rules, according to the sources, and are opposing requests to weigh up the profitability of projects or to lower standards.

    Burn company enumerator Teresia Wanjiru checks moisture on firewood at a client’s house using clean cookstoves in Kachoroba village of Kiambu county, Kenya, August 16, 2023. REUTERS/Monicah Mwangi