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Dr Laura-Jane Nolan is a carbon consultant and operations director at BOM Systems.

War leaves destruction in its wake – cities levelled, economies disrupted, lives lost. But another cost rarely enters the conversation: carbon emissions.

As the conflict in the Middle East grinds on, the world’s attention remains fixed on geopolitics and the loss of life and infrastructure. Yet the climate impact of modern warfare is largely invisible in both reporting and policy.

Using UK government greenhouse gas accounting frameworks and publicly available expenditure data, it is possible to estimate the emissions generated and the far larger footprint likely to follow during reconstruction.

Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister

According to researchers at Queen Mary University of London, in just the first 14 days, US-Israeli war with Iran generated more than 5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂e). While this represents only part of the total, it provides a rare, quantified entry point into the scale of the environmental damage caused so far.

Let’s be clear, direct measurement is not simple. Military fuel use, logistics and procurement data are rarely disclosed in detail. Researchers therefore rely on spend-based estimates, that is, the amount of CO2 equivalent per pound or dollar spent.

Post-conflict reconstruction

According to Reuters, the United States alone spent at least $11.3 billion (around £8.5 billion) in the first six days of the conflict. Using a conservative estimate of around 0.4 kg CO₂e per pound spent, the first six days of documented operations correspond to roughly 3.4 million tonnes of CO₂e.

After another week of conflict, the conservative estimate of over 5 million tonnes of CO₂e is not a small amount of greenhouse gases. It is roughly equivalent to 1.1 million cars driven for a year – all the cars in a large European city. It is also comparable to a million transatlantic flights.

If this seems shocking, these estimates likely underplay the situation. We haven’t considered the rebuilding of the destroyed buildings and infrastructure yet. Evidence from past conflicts shows that emissions from rebuilding, through cement, steel, asphalt and heavy machinery, can exceed those generated during active combat.

UK government data indicates that every £1 billion spent on construction generates approximately 250,000 to 350,000 tonnes of CO₂e, before accounting for debris clearance and supply-chain disruption.

In policy terms, this should prompt critical questions about how reconstruction should be financed and delivered, as investing in the green economy for new infrastructure will positively shape long-term emissions trajectories. Rebuilding antiquated infrastructure will be good money thrown after bad.

Gap in climate policy governance

Despite this, the climate cost of war remains largely absent from international frameworks. A loophole in the Kyoto Protocol even allowed countries to exclude military emissions from their national reporting. While the Paris Agreement removed Kyoto’s limited, sector-specific reporting rules and its focus on only developed countries – which had enabled greenhouse gases from overseas military activity to be kept out of the equation – military emissions are still inconsistently reported and rarely disaggregated.

This creates a gap in climate governance at precisely the historical moment when the climate system is shifting from predictable, linear change to a regime in which self-reinforcing, potentially irreversible changes will likely occur.

    Systematic carbon accounting for conflict and reconstruction using internationally agreed-upon frameworks such as ISO 14064-1 could set a new precedent for environmental accountability. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations Compensation Commission awarded billions of dollars for environmental damage, including oil fires and ecosystem loss. Carbon accounting could support post-conflict environmental assessments and contribute to just liability frameworks and reparations.

    Assessing infrastructure finance

    International institutions are already moving in this direction. Multilateral development banks increasingly apply climate conditions to infrastructure finance, and post-conflict reconstruction funding could follow similar principles. Embedding emissions accounting into these processes would align recovery efforts with existing climate commitments.

    The economic case is also completely clear for most people. The £8.5 billion spent in the first six days of the Iran conflict could have financed large-scale clean energy deployment, solar, wind, electrified heating and transport, delivering long-term returns, reducing fossil fuel dependence and strengthening energy security.

    Major oil producers among 46 nations joining fossil fuel phase-out summit

    Unlike military expenditure, these investments generate ongoing economic value. Yet the absence of systematic accounting for all aspects of war means these trade-offs remain largely invisible to policymakers, markets and the public.

    As debates grow around recognising ecocide as a crime under international law, the legal and institutional frameworks for addressing environmental harm are evolving. Integrating carbon accounting into conflict and reconstruction processes would be a pragmatic next step, reflecting both climate realities and existing policy trends.

    The climate cost of war is not hypothetical. It is measurable, material and increasingly unavoidable. The question is whether it will continue to be ignored.

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    Climate Change

    Minerals for the planet or for war and AI? COP31 must make clear what we prioritise

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    Elisa Morgera is the UN Special Rapporteur on Climate Change and Human Rights.

    For years, governments and international financial institutions have justified the mining boom by arguing that the energy transition cannot happen without critical minerals.

    Increasingly, however, they are securing those minerals for something else: weapons and artificial intelligence (AI).

    At COP31, governments must make clear what a sustainable and fair energy transition requires and reject demand for minerals that fuels war and other climate-harming uses. 

    Independent research shows that mineral demand is increasingly driven by AI and militarisation. Yet, both undermine climate action.

    Major armed conflicts are linked to fossil fuel expansion, generate emissions that are unaccounted for under the Paris Agreement, and deliver record profits to fossil fuel and petrochemical companies through price spikes and disrupted access to fuel and food.

    Meanwhile, AI infrastructure risks undoing the progress of the renewable energy transition by driving fossil fuel expansion to meet data centres’ vast new energy demand.

      UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the head of UN Climate Change Simon Stiell have both warned of the climate harm of unchecked, fossil fuel-powered AI and data centre growth.

      In addition, AI equipment and infrastructure require huge amounts of copper – one of the minerals most in demand for the energy transition. A recent academic study found that copper makes up roughly 82-83% of the mineral mass in data centres.

      None of this demand serves the energy transition. Instead, the climate case for mining is being used to legitimise uses that undermine a sustainable future.

      Mining still relies heavily on fossil fuels and often harms the environment, so it must be limited to extracting the resources strictly necessary for the energy transition. Otherwise, states breach their binding obligations to protect the environment and human rights, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made clear. 

      National security is the new mining fast track

      Campaigners have long warned that when minerals become a matter of national security, governments are more tempted to deregulate and fast-track mining projects. Communities pay the price.

      Extraction without adequate consultation is a global pattern linked to killings of land and environmental defenders. More than half of transition mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous lands, and allegations of abuses linked to mining transition minerals surged 73% in 2025 alone.

      Security and climate are not separate problems. Both are rooted in the fossil fuel-based global economy, now joined by the unchecked growth of AI and data centres.

      Who should benefit from minerals?

      Not every demand for minerals can or should be met. Minerals are finite and must be used to address the worsening climate crisis as a priority.

      The COP31 presidency’s push for electrification will have significant implications for mineral demand. At the same time, electrification doesn’t necessarily help to phase out fossil fuels. Governments must be clear about how minerals are being used and prioritise uses that genuinely advance the energy transition.

      • Climate action comes first: Mineral demand for the wind and solar projects that power communities and essential public services such as local food systems should be met first. Priority uses should include community-led wind and solar projects and renewable power for public transport.
      • No support for climate-harming activities: Mineral demand projections for the energy transition should exclude the military-industrial complex and data centres, and governments should reconsider public spending on militarisation. Mineral demand for electrification should also be scrutinised to avoid deepening fossil fuel dependence.
      • Cut demand before expanding supply: High-consuming countries should use less primary material through efficiency, longer-lasting products and by reducing car dependence, rather than exporting waste and harm to the Global South.
      • Prioritise energy needs: Those without access to energy must be served first. Overproduction and overconsumption must be curbed, otherwise the transition will neither mitigate climate change nor reduce poverty.
      • No mining without consent: No project should receive financing or permits without the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples and genuine consultations with affected communities.
      • No-go zones: States should establish no-go mining zones in ecologically sensitive areas, on land and at sea, and ensure that mining does not cause significant harm to biodiversity.

      What can COP31 do?

      Last year, governments agreed to develop a Just Transition Mechanism, but explicit provisions on transition mineral governance were dropped. At COP31, negotiators are reconsidering the issue. I urge negotiators in Antalya to: 

      • Reflect states’ obligations underpinning the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the UN Secretary-General’s Critical Energy Transition Minerals Panel principles in the Just Transition Work Programme.
      • Keep mineral demand for the military and digital infrastructure separate from demand that serves climate protection.
      • Require traceability and end-use disclosure, so it is publicly known whether a mineral ends up in a battery, a missile or a data centre.
      • Respect the human rights of Indigenous Peoples, peasants and environmental human rights defenders, including the right to say no, protection from reprisals and access to remedy.

      At COP31, transition minerals should be unequivocally linked to everyone’s human right to a safe climate and a healthy environment.

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      Climate Change

      Countries take up industry push to loosen UN carbon market rules at COP31

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      Dozens of countries – from big emerging economies to the world’s poorest nations – are calling for the UN’s new carbon market to reassess climate integrity rules, in a push that campaigners and researchers have blamed on industry lobbying.

      At COP31 talks on the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM) this weekend, the Like-Minded Developing Countries – a group that includes Saudi Arabia, India and China – the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and landlocked developing countries raised concerns about the requirements project developers must meet, according to sources familiar with the closed-door discussions.

      They warned about the cumulative weight of those requirements developed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as barriers to implementation. Several countries, including Singapore and some Latin American states, said rules must keep projects financially viable, while South Korea asked for proportionate requirements, the sources said.

      Their demands closely track arguments from carbon market industry groups, which claim PACM’s conservative approach to counting emission reductions is so strict that few projects will ever come to fruition.

      Industry and NGOs lobby to weaken UN carbon credit rules in “coordinated” push

      In a letter published ahead of COP31, the lobby groups asked governments to “raise implementation concerns” and to request that the Supervisory Body – the UN body that oversees the market – assess the “combined impact” of its rules on the feasibility of projects.

      The letter was signed by the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), a business group whose members include fossil fuel giants Shell, BP, Saudi Aramco and Chevron, along with the Project Developer Forum and the Wildlife Conservation Society, which develops forest conservation programmes.

      Draft text reflects industry demands

      Those demands are reflected in the first draft of the COP31 decision on the mechanism, published late on Saturday. To guard against over-crediting, PACM’s rules deliberately err on the side of issuing fewer credits when emissions cuts from projects are uncertain.

      The document asks the Supervisory Body to look at how these cautious assumptions add up across its rules and what that means for the number of credits, project costs and prices. The aim, it says, is to avoid “excessive compounding of conservative adjustments”.

      Other parts of the draft tell the body not to make its rules too cautious or too rigid. That includes efforts to guard against the risk that carbon captured by a project is later released. Most of these passages add that environmental integrity must be maintained.

      Risk of another ‘failure’

      “Weakening the rules is not climate ambition – it is a license to pollute,” said Erika Lennon, a senior attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). “As we are on the brink of permanently breaching 1.5C, we cannot afford to turn the carbon market into another loophole for polluters,” she added.

      Axel Michaelowa, research director at Perspectives Climate Research, said that if attempts to weaken the rules succeed, it could lead to another failure of an international carbon market. Demand for credits rests on trust, he said, and the slightest doubt over integrity erodes buyers’ willingness to pay.

      Calls to revise requirements “must be supported by scientific evidence, not unsupported claims of under-crediting – especially when these assumptions come from private actors whose revenues depend on the volume of transacted credits rather than real mitigation outcomes,” Michaelowa said.

      The EU, Switzerland and Senegal are among a handful of countries pushing back against demands to re-assess the market rules, according to the sources, and are opposing requests to weigh up the profitability of projects or to lower standards.

      Burn company enumerator Teresia Wanjiru checks moisture on firewood at a client’s house using clean cookstoves in Kachoroba village of Kiambu county, Kenya, August 16, 2023. REUTERS/Monicah Mwangi

      Burn company enumerator Teresia Wanjiru checks moisture on firewood at a client’s house using clean cookstoves in Kachoroba village of Kiambu county, Kenya, August 16, 2023. REUTERS/Monicah Mwangi

      Cookstove credits in focus

      At the centre of the fight are new methodologies for projects that aim to cut emissions by distributing cleaner cookstoves – one of the carbon market’s most popular credit types and also one of its most criticised for overstating climate benefits. A 2024 study in Nature Sustainability found cookstove projects had been over-credited roughly tenfold.

      Under the rules adopted by the Supervisory Body in October, cookstove project developers are required to set aside part of their credits in a buffer pool, in case the forests they claim to save later burn or are cleared.

      The body rejected an exemption from this requirement sought by developers, corporate buyers, some conservation groups and the UN Environment Programme, in what critics called a coordinated lobbying campaign, as reported by Climate Home News.

      Industry groups and some countries have seized on the cookstove methodologies to warn against excessively stringent requirements, which they say undercount emission reductions and deter developers. The LDCs told negotiators that developers had found some approved methodologies, including on clean cooking, difficult to apply.

      Industry group calls for revisions

      Industry representatives attacked the Supervisory Body’s approach in interventions that sources in the room described as very aggressive.

      In a subsequent Linkedin post, IETA’s Andrea Bonzanni accused the regulator of following an unscientific approach that would deliver systematic under-crediting. He called on environmental integrity standards to be amended and rulebooks to be revised.

      The mechanism “has had a false start”, he said, but countries in Antalya have a chance to agree on clear guidance that puts it back on track. “Unless the mechanism becomes workable across countries and activity types, its impact on the atmosphere risks remaining marginal,” he added.

      IETA did not respond to a request for comment.